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H I G H L I G H T S
• A distributed decision support for second-generation biomass markets is formulated.
• An Agent-Based Model is proposed defining various stakeholders as autonomous agents.
• Bioenergy production is investigated as a solution to manure disposal problem.
• The role of government is considered by investigating the role of external incentives.
• Findings provide a clear economic picture on conditions favoring profitable business.







A B S T R A C T
Biogas production from manure has been proposed as a partial solution to energy and environmental concerns.
However, manure markets face distortions caused by considerable unbalance between supply and demand and
environmental regulations imposed for soil and water protection. Such market distortions influence the co-
operation between animal farmers, biogas producers and arable land owners causing fluctuations in manure
prices paid (or incurred) by animal farmers. This paper adopts an agent-based modeling approach to investigate
the interactions between manure suppliers, i.e., animal farmers, and biogas producers in an industrial symbiosis
case example consisting of 19 municipalities in the Overijssel region (eastern Netherlands). To find the manure
price for successful cooperation schemes, we measure the impact of manure discharge cost, dimension and
dispersion of animal farms, incentives provided by the government for bioenergy production, and the investment
costs of biogas plants for different scales on the economic returns for both actor types and favorable market
conditions. Findings show that manure exchange prices may vary between −3.33 €/t manure (i.e., animal
farmer pays to biogas producer) and 7.03 €/t manure (i.e., biogas producer pays to animal farmer) and thanks to
cooperation, actors can create a total economic value added between 3.73 €/t manure and 39.37 €/t manure.
Hence, there are cases in which animal farmers can profitably be paid, but the presence of a supply surplus not
met by demand provides an advantage to arable land owners and biogas producers in the price contracting phase
in the current situation in the Netherlands.
1. Introduction
The rapid growth of the human population (+20% since 2000)
together with the growth in per capita energy use (+17% since 2000)
has resulted in a sharply increasing demand for energy [1–3]. Cur-
rently, around 80% of energy is produced from fossil fuels [2]. How-
ever, fossil-fuel based energy production is one of the main causes of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [4]. With the growing concern about
the impact of GHG emissions on climate change [5], the demand for
renewable energy is increasing [6,7] and several technologies have
been developed to produce energy from renewable resources. A well-
known example is the production of energy from second-generation
biomass (SGB) [8–10]. SGB refers to organic wastes and residues that
are not used in food production, e.g., solid and liquid municipal waste,
manure, lumber and pulp mill waste, and forest and agricultural re-
sidues, etc. [11–15]. In particular, the use of manure for energy pro-
duction may offer significant opportunities at places where intensive
livestock farming is practiced [16].
In the Netherlands, despite the fact that the amount of produced
manure is substantial (about 68.6 M t/year), the potential of manure-
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based energy production is currently not fully exploited because of
obstacles in the cooperation between manure producers and waste-to-
energy producers [17,18]. Producing energy from manure may offer
significant opportunities for the country towards achieving the goal of
European Energy Strategy, i.e., an 80–95% cut in GHG emissions up to
2050 when compared to the 1990 levels [19]. In fact, in Q4 of 2016,
CO2 emissions by the energy sector – about 30% of the total CO2
emissions – increased by 5.5% over the previous year, due to the in-
crease in electricity production at power stations [20]. Accordingly,
coal consumption has increased in the last years, whilst all the Eur-
opean countries showed the opposite trend [21].
The lack of cooperation among actors in the manure-based energy
supply chain (SC) forces animal farmers to discharge the manure as
compost in arable lands in the Netherlands [18]. However, before being
sent to arable lands, manure has to be collected from animal farmers
and treated in manure treatment units. Manure collection costs are paid
by animal farmers: the average price is 15 €/t – but the collection price
raises 23 €/t in September-February during which manure-based ferti-
lizer application to arable lands is forbidden – excluding transportation,
which accounts for 4–6 €/t due to the high dispersion of arable lands
and animal farms. Since the manure production highly exceeds the
manure-based fertilizer demand, animal farmers have low contractual
power and face difficulty to afford these prices [18].
Furthermore, since 2014, Dutch regulation reduced the amount of
manure-based fertilizers that can be used in arable lands, hence obli-
ging swine/cattle farmers to take a certain percentage of their manure
out of the Dutch manure market. This regulation is enforced by lim-
itations in the phosphate and nitrogen use (causing eutrophication). For
swine farmers, at least 50% of the manure produced should be taken
out the Dutch market by law [18]. However, with an average travel of
300 km to Germany or France, the average transportation cost of
manure is almost 50 €/t, which is considerably high for animal farmers
to sustain.
Having less contractual power caused by manure surplus and being
constrained by the regulation, animal farmers have to cope with in-
creased manure discharge cost. This leads to distortion in manure
markets pushing animal farmers to accept the offered collection price
by manure-treaters and arable land owners, i.e., animal farmers pay to
discharge manure in arable lands. In turn, this causes an increase also in
meat and dairy products’ prices, thereby creating a drawback for the
Dutch economy [18]. Such a drawback triggers stakeholders to look for
alternative solutions for manure use, one of which is the production of
biogas from manure to generate electric and heat energy.
However, implementing cooperation between animal farmers and
potential biogas producers is not easy due to the above-mentioned
market conditions. Also the spatial, operational, and technological
variables might affect the potential cooperation benefits between an-
imal farmers and biogas producers [22,23]. Few studies have
investigated the cooperation dynamics among actors within the
manure-based biogas SC and the need for further research on such a
topic is recognized [24]. This paper aims at filling this gap by analyzing
the impact of dynamic market conditions shaped by technological,
operational, spatial, and regulatory variables on the cooperation
schemes between animal farmers and biogas producers. We design an
agent-based model (ABM) to simulate the dynamics of manure markets
for biogas production aimed at producing electricity and heat. In par-
ticular, we aim at revealing the conditions which facilitate reciprocally
sustainable cooperation between animal farmers and biogas producers.
We particularly analyze the impact of five variables on the creation of
cooperative relations between animal farmers and hypothetical biogas
producers in a case example considering 19 municipalities in the pro-
vince of Overijssel (eastern Netherlands). These variables are: (i) the
total discharge cost of manure influenced by transportation distance
from animal farm to arable land and seasonality in manure-based fer-
tilizer application to arable lands; (ii) size, number, and geographical
distribution of animal farms within the municipality; (iii) incentives for
renewable energy; (iv) the threshold return on investment (ROI) for
biogas production; and (v) the threshold cost reduction by farmers
compared to the current situation. The impact of these variables is as-
sessed on two performance measures: (i) manure exchange prices
(MEPs) negotiated by the involved actors and (ii) the overall economic
benefits created. Simulation results allow us to propose managerial and
practical solutions to overcome market distortions.
Hence this paper is a seminal and novel study for analyzing the
dynamics of manure markets for biogas production aimed at producing
electricity and heat. All the policy variables are integrated to the pro-
posed ABM as a game changer. Thus, the combination of operational
and political conditions embedded in the ABM enables companies to
foresee the costs and benefits of a potential cooperation and base their
decisions upon these insights.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the generic
ABM for the cooperation between animal farmers and biogas producers.
Section 4 applies the ABM to the case example of Overijssel. Section 5
provides the results analysis, followed by the discussion in Section 6
and conclusions in Section 7.
2. Theoretical background
This section contains two sub-sections. The Section 2.1 provides a
detailed and thorough review of the literature on bioenergy supply
chains (SC), in particular on manure-based bioenergy production. The
Section 2.2 focuses on Agent-based Modeling and its applications in the








F set of animal farmers
j biogas producer
B set of biogas producers
Pi manure production capacity
Pj biogas plant production capacity
PM total amount of produced manure
RM total amount of required manure
DC manure discharge cost
Q exchanged quantity of manure
CI biogas plant investment costs
ROI return on investment
CF cash flow
R actualization rate
RE revenues from electricity sales
RH revenues from heat sales
RI revenues from incentives to energy production from
manure
CT manure transportation cost
CO biogas plant operating cost
MEP manure exchange price
MK mark-up
EROI energy return on investment
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2.1. Manure-based bioenergy production and supply chains
The need to reduce fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions triggered the production of bioenergy from various
types of feedstock of organic origin, such as food crops, agricultural
residues, forestry residues or municipal solid waste [25]. However, the
application of food crops for energy purposes, so-called first-generation
bioresources, has been criticized, since it is recognized to be responsible
for increases in prices of food and animal feeds. Such critics have turned
the attention to alternative organic feedstocks, the so-called second-
generation bioresources, which are not sourced from dedicated plan-
tations directly competing for agricultural land. The production of
second-generation biofuels has been largely investigated from a tech-
nical, environmental, and economic point of view [16,26–34]. Within
the field of second-generation biomass (SGB) processing, the energy
production from animal manure has been particularly explored. From a
technical point of view, manure-based bioenergy can be produced in
two different ways: (i) producing biogas by anaerobic digestion (AD)
and (ii) producing biochar, bio-oil, and gases through pyrolysis
[35–38]. AD seems to be the most used technology, since it ensures the
highest performance from both environmental and economic perspec-
tives [39].
From an operational perspective, the technical conditions of the AD
plant (e.g., [40–42]) and the joint use of different types of feedstocks
and manure (e.g., [43,44]) influence the stability and performance of
biogas production. From an environmental point of view, Hamelin et al.
[45] claim that producing biogas from manure causes lower CO2
emissions than producing biogas from other types of feedstocks. Fur-
thermore, several studies explore the economic and financial viability
of biogas production from manure in different countries. Some ex-
amples are Sweden [46], Ireland [23], Spain [47], Portugal [48], Italy
[16], Germany and France [49], China [50], the Netherlands [38], and
Canada [51]. In particular, the economic impact of market conditions
(e.g., amount of feedstock available, renewable electricity tariff) was
investigated. Whilst in some cases market conditions can ensure high
profitability for bioenergy production, in other cases they have a ne-
gative impact on the economic viability of bioenergy production.
Biogas produced through AD may be used for electricity, heat and
steam generation or to produce biomethane, which in turn can be in-
jected into the natural gas grid or be used as fuel for transportation
[52,53]. In this regard, some studies claim that, in order to maximize
GHG mitigation, production of electricity from biogas is the best option
[54,55]. The environmental benefits of producing electricity from
biogas instead of from fossil fuels are widely acknowledged [53,56,57].
Recently, instead of focusing on the production phase only, several
studies started to address the bioenergy supply chain (SC) as a whole,
i.e., all processes related to biomass production, collection, transport,
conversion into energy, and final use of the produced energy. Designing
bioenergy SCs includes technical (e.g., selection of feedstock, process
technologies, bioenergy plant size, amount of feedstock used by the
plant), operational (e.g., centralized vs. decentralized production,
bioenergy plant location, biomass collection schedule and transporta-
tion), and economic (e.g., market competitiveness of bioenergy against
fossil-based energy) variables, in order to minimize production costs or
maximize profits for the entire SC. In this regard, Yazan et al. [58]
investigated the sustainable design of a regional bioenergy SC proces-
sing lignocellulosic biomass in the province of Overijssel (Eastern
Netherlands). In particular, they compared the economic performance
of four scenarios shaped by spatial and technological variables: (i) a
mobile pyrolysis plant processes the locally available biomass on-site
into pyrolysis oil which is sent to a regional biofuel production unit for
upgrading to marketable biofuel; (ii) local biomass is collected and
transported to a regional pyrolysis-based biofuel production unit for
upgrading to a marketable biofuel; (iii) a mobile pyrolysis plant per-
forms the on-site conversion to pyrolysis oil which is transported to an
oil refinery outside the region; and (iv) collected biomass is sent to the
nearest electricity production unit to generate electricity. Their findings
show that mobile biomass processing is economically feasible for the
Overijssel region while for larger regions its economic convenience
depends on how many times the mobile plant is set-up in different lo-
cations within the region. De Jong et al. [59] used a geography-explicit
cost optimization model to analyze the impact of four cost reduction
strategies for second-generation biofuel production: (i) economies of
scale; (ii) intermodal transport; (iii) integration with existing industries;
and (iv) distributed SC configurations (i.e. the adoption of intermediate
pre-treatment steps to reduce biomass transport cost). Furthermore,
several optimization models for bioenergy SC design have been pro-
posed. Jonker et al. [60] designed a linear optimization model to de-
termine the optimal location and scale of bioenergy plants given the
projected spatial distribution of the expansion of biomass production
between 2012 and 2030 in the state of Goiás (Brazil). D’Amore and
Bezzo [61] used mixed integer linear programming model to simulta-
neously maximize economic and environmental benefits of a bioethanol
SC in Northern Italy. The model allows to optimize the variables such as
geographical location of biomass to be collected, biomass production
rate and feedstock mix, technology selection, and facility location and
scale. Babazadeh et al. [62] proposed an integrated hybrid approach
based on data envelopment analysis and mathematical programming
techniques for the strategic design of a biodiesel SC in Iran based on
jatropha and waste cooking oil. The model optimizes the numbers, lo-
cations, and capacities of feedstock cultivation centers and waste
cooking oil collection centers, as well as bio-refineries and distribution
centers. Mayerle and Neiva de Figueiredo [63] developed a metho-
dology to design a SC that maximizes the economic performance and
minimizes the biomass transportation distances from numerous small-
scale farms to the AD plant serving the region. The model allows to
identify: (i) the optimal schedule for biomass collection from each farm;
(ii) the optimal logistics and transportation system; and (iii) the optimal
position of a digestion plant relative to the farm locations. Miret et al.
[64] proposed a mixed integer linear programming model for de-
termining the optimal SC design, facility location, process selection and
inventory policy. Their model is able to account for biomass season-
ality, geographical availability, biomass degradation, conversion tech-
nologies, and final product demand.
Most of the above-mentioned optimization models assume nominal
parameter values, leading to solutions that perform well only in the
most likely scenario or in a specific location, whilst in reality un-
expected changes in the market conditions can occur over time. Since
such changes can strongly affect the economic performance of SCs (e.g.,
[65–67]), recently some studies claim that the optimization of biomass
SCs should take into account the uncertainty in market conditions. In
this regard, Santibañez-Aguilar et al. [68] proposed a mathematical
programming model for the optimal planning of a bioenergy SC that
considers explicitly the uncertainty associated with the SC operations as
well as the associated risk. Similarly, Hu et al. [69] developed a cy-
berGIS approach to optimize biomass SCs under uncertainty caused by
a number of factors such as biomass yield, procurement prices, market
demand, transportation costs, and processing technologies. In parti-
cular, 7000 scenarios are evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation to
quantify the uncertainty and sensitivity impact of the above-mentioned
factors on bioenergy production costs and optimal biomass SC config-
urations in Illinois (USA). However, these studies do not consider SCs
composed of different business entities, i.e., SCs where biomass pro-
duction and bioenergy production reside to different companies. In this
regard, it is widely acknowledged that SCs composed of different
business entities can be implemented only if all involved entities have
shown willingness to cooperate [70–72]. Such a willingness highly
depends on adequate economic gaining induced by economic agree-
ments (e.g., the internal exchange price of intermediate products) fa-
vorable for all involved companies [73–76].
For bioenergy SCs, the feedstock supply price is recognized as the
most important factor allowing the chain to be created, along with a
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number of political and spatial factors [77]. If a market for a particular
type of biomass does not exist, the exchange price has to be negotiated
between biomass producers and bioenergy producers. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no studies have investigated the cooperation
dynamics among actors within the manure-based biogas SC to compute
the manure exchange price (MEP) under different operational sce-
narios. In particular, no studies have been carried out to understand
how the supply-demand mismatch for manure influences potential
business deals between manure suppliers and biogas producers.
Therefore, this paper proposes an Agent-based Model (ABM) that con-
siders the business strategy of each SC actor influenced by a combina-
tion of the above-mentioned variables and provides decision support to
the practitioners to reveal the conditions for an economically sustain-
able business practice. The ABM proposed in this paper is a globally
applicable model that takes into account multiple variables and yields
different results for the combination of different geographical locations,
discharge regulations, subsidies, adopted technologies, and market
conditions.
2.2. The agent-based modeling approach
Agent-based modeling is a suitable approach to study complex
systems consisting of autonomous decision-making entities, such as
production networks and SCs. Accordingly, each entity is modeled as an
independent agent, which is provided with: (i) a set of goals it has to
accomplish through the interaction with other agents and the en-
vironment; and (ii) a set of rules of social engagement, driving such
interactions [78,79]. The system behavior spontaneously emerges from
the interactions between the agents, and between the agents and the
environment, rather than to be defined by the modeler [80]. The in-
teractions between agents are often complex and nonlinear; therefore,
patterns, structures, behaviors, and phenomena that are not explicitly
programmed in the model can emerge spontaneously [80]. Accord-
ingly, through these models, researchers are able to consider aspects
which cannot be investigated by analytical models [81]. In an ABM,
decision rules must be as realistic and accurate as possible, otherwise
simulations may lead to misconceived results [82].
Applications of ABM span a broad range of disciplines such as
marketing [83], economic systems [84,85], finance [86,87], manu-
facturing [88,89], SCs [90–92], and energy production and manage-
ment [93–95]. The dynamic nature of ABM makes it suitable for
studying the outcomes of collaborative relationships among agents
[96]. In this regard, relationships among firms involved in the same SC
have been investigated, with the aim to design the contractual clauses
that are able to optimize the SC performance [88] or to equally share
benefits from cooperation between firms [76,97].
ABM is recognized as an appropriate methodology to investigate
cooperation among actors in bioenergy SCs as it considers the hetero-
geneity of the actors (i.e., agents) and proposes a self-organizing system
[80,98]. Several contributions can be found in the literature. Shastri
et al. [99] analyzed the dynamics of the adaptation of Miscanthus as an
agricultural crop and its impact on biorefinery capacity in Illinois.
Alexander et al. [100] modeled the UK perennial energy crop market,
including the contingent interaction of supply and demand, to under-
stand the spatial and temporal dynamics of energy crop adoption. Sorda
et al. [101] investigated how changes in the support scheme may affect
electricity generation from agriculture-based combined heat and power
biogas plants in Germany. Singh et al. [102] simulated the corn markets
in Illinois, to investigate the dynamic corn prices arising from the in-
teractions between producers and users. Mertens et al. [103] explored
the effect of market context on the purchase of local biomass for
anaerobic digestion (AD) in Belgium. Moncada et al. [92] investigated
the effect of institutions on the emergence of biofuel SCs in Germany.
However, up to the best knowledge of the authors, no studies exist
adopting the ABM approach for manure-based bioenergy SCs. Our
paper fills this gap in the literature from a methodological perspective
and provides a decision support framework to the actors of manure-
based biogas SCs.
3. The agent-based model for cooperation among animal farmers
and biogas producers
Cooperation among animal farmers (manure producers) and biogas
producers (manure users) aims at exploiting the manure for biogas
production. Such a cooperation can generate economic benefits for both
actors: the animal farmer benefits from reduction in manure disposal
costs and the biogas producer benefits from electric energy and heat
sales. However, the cooperation may arise only if characterized by a
win-win condition, i.e., both parties should achieve an economic benefit
that at least offsets the costs of cooperation. In particular, biogas pro-
ducers have to sustain relevant investment costs [104] and the obtained
economic benefits should counterbalance such costs. Moreover, mone-
tary flows might exist between animal farmers and biogas producers,
depending on the contractual clauses associated with the manure ex-
change. In particular, three different clauses can be adopted [76]: (i)
biogas producer pays animal farmer to purchase the produced manure;
(ii) animal farmer pays biogas producer to dispose of the manure; and
(iii) the exchange is for free. In absence of a manure exchange market,
the manure exchange price (MEP) has to be negotiated for each specific
relationship. In this regard, cooperation between animal farmers and
biogas producers arises only if the actors reach a mutually beneficial
agreement.
The ABM presented in this section simulates the interaction between
two kinds of agents, animal farmers ∈i F and biogas producers ∈j B,
with F and B representing the sets of farmers and biogas producers,
respectively. Let us assume that |F|=N farmers and |B|=M biogas
producers exists in a given area. Each farmer i is characterized by
manure production capacity Pi, standing for the amount of manure
generated per year. Each biogas producer j is characterized by the
production capacity Pj, standing for the maximum amount of manure
that it can yearly process to produce electric energy and heat via
anaerobic digestion (AD). Accordingly, the total amount of produced
manure by farmers (PM), as well as the total amount of required















In the absence of cooperation (basic scenario), each farmer has to
dispose of the produced manure. Hence, the generic farmer i pays
manure discharge cost =DC i d P( ) ·c i, where dc is the unit discharge cost
per ton of manure. Moreover, in the basic scenario, biogas producers do
not obtain revenues from selling electric energy and heat. For this
reason, the generic biogas producer j is interested in using the manure
produced by farmers to generate energy: accordingly, its ultimate goal
is to obtain economic benefits from the cooperation. To achieve this
goal, j can cooperate with n≤N farmers; in turn, each farmer can
cooperate with m≤M biogas producers.
When j tries to establish cooperation with i, the quantity of manure
to be potentially exchanged is defined as the minimum between the
current manure demand by j, i.e., Rj, and the current amount of manure
that i is able to send to j, i.e., Ri.
→ =Q i j R R( ) min{ ; }j i (3)
Obviously = −∑ →= ≠R P Q i j( )j j i i j
N
1; . Accordingly, Rj is equal to Pj if
j is currently not receiving manure from other farmers, whereas it is
lower than Pj if j is currently cooperating with other farmers. Similarly,
it results that = −∑ →= ≠R P Q i j( )i i j j i
N
1; . Accordingly, Ri is equal to Pi if i
is not sending manure to other biogas producers, whereas it is lower
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than Pi if i is currently cooperating with other biogas producers.
In order to cooperate with i, j has to sustain investment costs CI(j→
i) [22,104], and its economic return on investment ROI(j→ i), is com-
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where 15 years of investment life time is assumed [104]. The parameter
r stands for the actualization rate, while CF(j→ i, t) is the cash flow at
year t resulting from the cooperation with F(i). In particular, such a
cash flow is computed by using the following equation [105]:
→ = → + → + →
− → + → − → →
CF j i t RE j i t RH j i t RI j i t
CT j i t CO j i t MEP j i t Q j i
( , ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]
[ ( , ) ( , )] ( , )· ( ) (5)
All revenues and costs in Eq. (5) are defined in Table 1 [22].
We assume that all costs, except for the MEP, are sustained by j in
case of cooperation. On the other hand, the MEP stems from contractual
clauses related to the manure exchange and is representative for how
the overall economic benefits from the transaction are shared between
the agents. MEP(j→ i, t) is higher than zero if j pays i to purchase the
manure. On the contrary, MEP(j→ i, t) is lower than zero if i pays j to
dispose of its manure. Finally, MEP(j→ i, t) is equal to zero if the
manure exchange is for free. j is interested to cooperate with i only if it
realizes a sufficient return on investment (ROI), i.e., if the ROI is higher
than a threshold value. In the opposite case, such an investment is
evaluated as not rewarding by j; accordingly, j is not interested to co-
operate with i and it will try to cooperate with another farmer.
To reveal the role of five variables highlighted in the introduction,
scenarios are constructed based on the combination of these variables.
Hence, the Agent-Based Simulation is conducted to evaluate the con-
ditions for forming the SGB market. When the simulation starts, j pro-
poses to i to exchange →Q i j( ) units of manure and a MEP that would
make the relationship beneficial for itself, allowing to guarantee the
threshold ROI by j. The MEP proposed by j affects the benefits for i
stemming from cooperation with j. These benefits are computed by i in
the form of a mark-up MK(i, t) on its costs associated to the case of no-
cooperation (Eq. (6)). This is a comparative approach between co-
operation and non-cooperation cases because if the farmers cannot
achieve business with biogas producers, then the current market con-
ditions apply for them, i.e., DC must be paid. The ABM considers the
biogas producers as the first proposers because animal farmers are al-
ready facing the drawback of existing regulations on DC. Relative mark-
up values are specifically considered in the ABM as each farmer has the
autonomy of defining a threshold to be engaged in business with biogas
producers.
= − − → + → →MK i t DC i t d R Q i j MEP j i t Q i j
DC i t




DC(i, t) is the cost that i sustains in the absence of cooperation, while
− → + → →d R Q i j MEP j i t Q i j{ ·[ ( )] ( , )· ( )}c i is the cost sustained by i
when it is cooperating with j. This is the summation of the saved dis-
charge costs and the MEP paid/requested by j. i is interested to co-
operate with j only if it obtains a sufficient mark-up on its costs asso-
ciated to the basic scenario, i.e., if MK(i, t) is higher than a threshold
value. In the opposite case, i will prefer to not cooperate with j and it
will wait for the offer of another biogas producer, hoping to obtain
better conditions. In this case, j looks for another farmer and tries to
establish a cooperation with it, whereas i becomes available to receive
proposals from other biogas producers, hoping to obtain better condi-
tions. The generic biogas producer j tries to establish cooperation with
farmers until it reaches the production capacity Pj.
4. The Overijssel case example
This section is divided into two sub-sections, one providing the
description of the case example and the latter explaining the scenario
design.
Table 1
Revenues obtained and costs sustained by the biogas producer in case of cooperation in year t.
Revenue or
cost
Description Formula Parameter description
RE (j→ i, t) Revenues in year t from electric energy sales produced
from the manure obtained from i by biogas producer j
→ = →RE j i t by Q i j cre ep( , ) · ( )· · by= biogas yield [m3 biogas/t manure]
cre= conversion rate electricity-biogas
[kW h/m3]
ep= electricity price [€/kW h]
RH (j→ i, t) Revenues in year t from heat sales produced from the
manure obtained from i by biogas producer j
→ = →RH j i t by Q i j crh ep( , ) · ( )· · by= biogas yield [m3 biogas/t manure]
crh= conversion rate heat-biogas
[kW h/m3]
hp=heat price [€/kW h]
RI (j→ i, t) Revenues in year t from incentives to energy
production from the manure obtained from i by biogas
producer j
→ = →RI j i t by Q i j cre gi( , ) · ( )· · by= biogas yield [m3 biogas/t manure]
cre= conversion rate electricity-biogas
[kW h/m3]
gi= government incentive for energy
production [€/kW h]
CT (j→ i, t) Transportation costs in year t related to the manure
exchanged between j and i
→ = → →CT j i t( , ) Q i j di i j cttl av
( )· ( )·
·
d(i→ j)= distance from farmer i to
biogas producer j [km]
av= average velocity [km/h]
ct= transportation cost per hour [€/h]
tl= truck load [t]
CO (j→ i, t) Operating costs of biogas plant j in year t due to
electricity and heat production from the manure
exchanged with i
→ = →CO j i t by Q i j cre rc( , ) · ( )· · by= biogas yield [m3 biogas/t manure]
cre= conversion rate electricity-biogas
[kW h/m3]
rc= running cost [€/kW h]
CI(j→ i) Investment in the biogas plant j to process the manure
supplied by animal farmer i
→ = →CI j i t Q i j by cre cc( , ) ( )· · · by= biogas yield [m3 biogas/t manure]
cre= conversion rate electricity-biogas
[kW h/m3]
cc= capital cost of the biogas plant
[€/kW h]
MEP (j→ i, t) Manure exchange price paid by j to i in year t The value of MEP stems from negotiation between farmers
and biogas producers
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4.1. Case description
Overijssel is located in the eastern Netherlands (Fig. 1) and is one of
the regions where animal farming is highly intensive. In Overijssel, there
are 19 municipalities with swine manure surplus (Table 2). The Bioe-
nergy Atlas of the Overijssel Region provides the quantities of swine
manure surplus at municipality level [106]. In this section, the potential
use of the excess manure in biogas production is evaluated. It is assumed
that each municipality employs the available surplus in one biogas plant
within the municipality and the manure is dispersed among animal farms
with different scales. The distance between a farm and biogas plant
implemented within the same municipality is a random value between 0
and 15 km, in line with the region’s territorial size. We aim to understand
whether biogas production is economically feasible for different scales of
hypothetical biogas plants receiving manure from dispersed farmers
within the municipality with different distances.
To design the agent-based model (ABM), we consider a generic
municipality where N farmers produce manure and one biogas producer
is available to use it for electric energy and heat production. In line with
the current situation in the Dutch manure market as explained in
Section 1, we assume no manure transportation between municipalities
as the manure processing capacity of one biogas plant is assumed to be
equal to the manure surplus of the municipality where it is located. This
means that in each municipality, one biogas plant absorbs the manure
surplus and accordingly we can evaluate the impact of plant scale on
the sustainability of the business. Such a model allows us also to un-
derstand the effect of manure regulations in case there is no manure
supply-demand mismatch. Contrary to the generic ABM, the presence of
only one biogas producer in one municipality does not allow the
farmers to receive offers from biogas producers located in other mu-
nicipalities. This is motivated by the fact that the capacity of a biogas
plant is designed based upon the available surplus within the munici-
pality. Accordingly, we can also understand how the economies of scale
influence the one-to-one cooperation conditions.
4.2. Scenarios design
In this subsection, we present the spatial, economic, and regulatory
factors that influence the cooperation among farmers and biogas pro-
ducers. These factors affect the economic benefits for each agent in case
of cooperation as well as their willingness to cooperate. We investigate
the impact of five factors: (i) governmental incentives for energy pro-
duction by manure; (ii) the threshold return on investment (ROI) by
biogas producers; (iii) manure discharge cost; (iv) the threshold mark-
up by farmers; and (v) the geographical distribution of farmers within
the municipality.
For the biogas producers, revenues from electricity sales are affected
by the subsidy provided by the government to renewable energy pro-
ducers. Biogas production receives an incentive of 7–15 eurocents/kW h
depending on the efficiency of technology used in the plant and it is an
important economic parameter for the biogas plant to compete with
fossil energy markets [18]. Ceteris paribus, the higher the obtained
subsidy, the higher the revenues from selling electric energy will be. We
investigate cooperation for three different levels of incentives: 0.07 €/
kW h, 0.11 €/kWh, and 0.15 €/kW h. Moreover, the economic perfor-
mance of biogas producers is also affected by the threshold ROI of
energy production from manure. This parameter is representative for
the minimum benefit that biogas producers want to obtain from the
cooperation: the higher the threshold ROI, the higher the threshold
economic return will be. We consider three levels of ROI: 10%, 20%,
and 30%, in line with the fact that agents are autonomous in decision-
Fig. 1. Map of the Overijssel region and manure
quantities per each municipality [106].
Table 2





Zwolle 11,959 Deventer 12,768
Dalfsen 60,411 Rijssen-Holten 28,441
Ommen 39,009 Hof van Twente 160,709
Olst-Wijhe 26,978 Borne 3231
Raalte 117,211 Denekamp 68,892
Hellendoorn 52,713 Losser 3171
Wierden 29,045 Oldenzaal 1739
Almelo 34,291 Haaksbergen 54,373
Vriezenveen 1583 Hengelo 2143
Tubbergen 84,990
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making and each of them might have different profit expectations.
For the farmers, the manure discharge cost affects their economic
performance. Caused by environmental regulations for surplus manure
discharge, manure discharge cost to arable lands might reach to 30 €/t,
depending on the distance between farmers and arable lands where the
manure is discharged, as well as on the seasonality in manure-based
fertilizer application to arable lands. In fact, manure discharge cost
usually increases during the period of 1 September till 30 January when
the manure application to arable land is prohibited [107]. We consider
three levels of manure discharge cost: 0 €/t, 15 €/t, and 30 €/t. Using a
minimum discharge cost of 0 €/t helps us to understand the role of the
manure discharge regulation in the market, while 30 €/t is the extreme
case when the manure is transported over long distances during the
period of 1 September till 30 January. In turn, the manure discharge
cost is decisive for the threshold mark-up for farmers. Similar to the
threshold ROI for biogas producers, this parameter is representative for
the minimum economic benefit that farmers want to obtain from the
cooperation: the higher the minimum mark-up desired by farmers, the
higher the economic benefit will be if the cooperation is implemented.
We investigate the cooperation conditions when the threshold mark-up
is equal to 5%, 10%, and 15% of the discharge cost in arable lands
incurred in the no-cooperation scenario. In addition, the number and
spatial distribution of the farmers with different scales within a muni-
cipality are also critical factors influencing the cooperation decisions.
Hence, we address the role of transportation for both non-cooperation
and cooperation cases, combined with other factors. Numerical values
of the investigated parameters are displayed in Table 3.
Referring to the spatial distribution of farmers, the manure can be
produced by only one big farm (producing all the manure of the mu-
nicipality) or conversely by many small farms (each of them producing
a small percentage of the total produced manure) or by a combination
of different scale farms within a given municipality. We consider nine
farm sizes, each of which produces a different percentage of the total
manure generated within the municipality (Table 4).
Thus, 2909 different combinations of farm dispersion are possible,
ranging from one farmer producing 100% of the total manure to 40
small farmers each producing 2.5% of the total manure generated
within a municipality. In particular, to simulate the spatial dispersion of
these farms within the municipality, each farm has a random distance
to the biogas plant ranging from 0 to 15 km.
By combining the above-mentioned parameters, 3 subsidy values for
electricity production from renewable sources times 3 threshold ROI
values by biogas producers times 3 manure discharge cost values times
3 threshold mark-up values by farmers times 2909 combinations of
farm dispersion results in 235,629 different scenarios for each muni-
cipality. Within a scenario, the locations of the farms are generated
randomly, i.e., the distance between each farm and the biogas producer
is random. To provide accurate results, we perform 30 replications for
each scenario, which is sufficient to reach a relative error of at most
0.1% with a confidence level of 99%. The simulation was coded in
Matlab and simulations were performed using Matlab R2015a. Two
outcomes are computed in each simulation: (i) the annual economic
benefit (per ton manure exchanged) for animal farmer and biogas
producer resulting from each cooperation between an animal farmer
and a biogas producer; and (ii) the manure exchange price (MEP) for
each relationship. The first outcome is representative for the overall
benefits obtainable from cooperation. The overall economic benefits are
computed as the sum of the benefits for the biogas producer (stemming
from the gains on the investment) and the benefit for farmers (stem-
ming from the savings on manure disposal costs and additional rev-
enues, i.e., when the biogas producer pays farmers to receive the
manure). The second outcome provides information about how these
benefits are shared among the agents: the higher the MEP, the higher
the economic benefit for farmers, ceteris paribus. In addition to the total
economic benefits and MEP, also the Energy Return on Investment
(EROI) is computed for a combination of transportation distances and
processed manure quantities. Nine scenarios are evaluated and an EROI
for each scenario is computed. Table 5 summarizes the operational
parameters used for the computations. Results are presented in the next
section.
5. Results
In this section, we provide the results under four sub-sections. In the
Section 5.1, we summarize the conditions that enable market formation
for manure destined to bioenergy production. Manure exchange price
(MEP), total economic benefits created, and energy return on invest-
ment (EROI) are respectively provided in the Sections 5.2–5.4.
5.1. Conditions for the implementation of manure markets
For each municipality, the overall amount of economic benefits
created by the cooperation mainly depends on the amount of manure
surplus in that municipality, ceteris paribus: the higher the exchanged
manure quantity, the higher the overall economic benefits created by
cooperation. For this reason, we present the economic benefits stem-
ming from cooperation per unit of exchanged manure.
The effect of different combinations of farm dispersion varies among
municipalities, depending on their manure surplus quantities. In par-
ticular, we find different results for quantities lower than 10,000 t (i.e.,
small-scale plant), between 10,000 t and 20,000 t (i.e., medium-scale
plant), or higher than 20,000 t (i.e., large-scale plant). This effect is due
to the economies of scale in biogas plant investments.
All the investigated factors, except for the threshold mark-up for
farmers, affect at least one outcome. This means that when the co-
operation takes place, the mark-up on costs obtained by farmers always
exceeds 15% (i.e., the cooperation is always convenient for farmers),
whereas when the cooperation does not occur, the mark-up is always
lower than 5% (i.e., the cooperation is never convenient for farmers).
Results (Tables 6 and 7) show that in some scenarios not even one
relationship is created, meaning that the manure market cannot be
established. In particular, the market is not created under the following
conditions: (i) manure discharge cost is 0 €/t, incentives for energy
production are 0.07 €/kWh, and the amount of available manure is
lower than 10,000 t/y; (ii) manure discharge cost is 0 €/t, incentives for
energy production are 0.07 €/kW h, the threshold ROI by biogas pro-
ducers is 30%, and the amount of available manure is lower than
20,000 t/y: (iii) manure discharge cost is 0 €/t, incentives for energy
production are 0.11 €/kW h, the threshold ROI by biogas producers is
30%, and the amount of available manure is lower than 10,000 t/y. In
these scenarios, the market is not realized because the highest MEP the
biogas producer is willing to offer is lower than the lowest MEP that
farmers are willing to accept. Therefore, since agents do not agree on
the MEP, no cooperation is created among them.
In all other scenarios, the manure market is created and the ex-
changed manure quantity is equal to the available quantity within the
municipality.
Table 3
Factors whose impact on the cooperation between farmers and biogas producers is in-
vestigated.
Agent Factor Values




Threshold ROI (fraction) 0.1; 0.2; 0.3
Animal farmers Manure discharge cost [€/t] 0; 15; 30
Threshold mark-up (fraction) 0.05; 0.1; 0.15
Distribution within the
municipality
Ranging from many small
farmers to one large farmer
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5.2. Manure exchange price
Table 6 shows the MEP resulting from the negotiation between
farmers and biogas producers and the variables affecting the price.
Depending on the specific environmental conditions, the MEP
ranges from −3.33 €/t (farmers pay the biogas producer) to 7.03 €/t
(biogas producer pays farmers). In particular, farmers pay the biogas
producer under the following conditions: (i) manure discharge cost is
not lower than 15 €/t, incentives for energy production are 0.07 €/
kW h, the amount of exchanged manure is lower than 20,000 t/y, and
the threshold ROI by the biogas producer is not lower than 20%; (ii)
manure discharge cost is at least 15 €/t, incentives for energy produc-
tion are 0.11 €/kW h, the threshold ROI by the biogas producer is not
lower than 20%, and the amount of exchanged manure is lower than
10,000 t/y; (iii) manure discharge cost is at least 15 €/t, incentives for
energy production are 0.07 €/kWh, the threshold ROI by the biogas
producer is 10%, and the amount of exchanged manure is lower than
10,000 t/y. Under all the other conditions, the biogas producer pays the
farmers. The MEP is mainly affected by the threshold ROI of the biogas
producer, the incentive to the energy production from manure, and the
manure exchanged quantity. In particular:
– The higher the threshold ROI of the biogas producer, the lower the
MEP is, ceteris paribus (Fig. 2a). In fact, a higher ROI means that the
biogas producer wants to obtain higher economic benefits from the
cooperation; hence, it is able to pay a lower price to farmers (when
MEP > 0), or in some cases it wants to be paid to receive the
manure (when MEP < 0);
– The higher the incentive to the energy production from manure, the
higher the MEP is, ceteris paribus (Fig. 2b). Since economic in-
centives increase the revenues for the biogas producer, ceteris par-
ibus, it will be able to pay a higher price to farmers to receive their
manure;
– The higher the exchanged manure quantity, the higher the MEP is,
ceteris paribus (Fig. 2c). This is because the investment costs for the
biogas producer are affected by economies of scale. Hence, when the
amount of exchanged manure is high, the biogas producer is able to
pay a higher price to farmers to receive the manure, ceteris paribus.
In particular, when the manure quantity is higher than 20,000 t, the
MEP is always positive, i.e., the biogas producer pays farmers to
purchase their manure.
Furthermore, we find that the manure discharge cost only affects the
decision of agents to start the cooperation but it does not affect the
MEP. In fact, when the manure discharge cost is higher than zero
(presence of manure discharge regulation), the cooperation starts only
if the biogas producer is willing to pay farmers to receive the manure. In
the opposite case, farmers will prefer to dispose of the manure.
Moreover, no differences in the MEP are found between scenarios
characterized by manure discharge cost equal to 15 €/t and 30 €/t,
ceteris paribus.
5.3. Economic benefits of the cooperation
Table 7 shows the economic benefits stemming from the coopera-
tion between farmers and biogas producers, as well as the variables
affecting these benefits.
The economic benefits created by the cooperation mainly depend on
the manure discharge cost, the exchanged manure quantity, and the
incentives for energy production from manure. In particular:
Table 4
Swine farm compositions according to their contribution to the total supply in a muni-
cipality.











Operational parameters used for computations.
Biogas yield by 36.9 [m3/t]
Conversion rate electricity-biogas cre 1.7 [kW h/m3]
Electricity price ep 0.056 [€/kW h]
Conversion rate heat-biogas crh 2138 [kWh/m3]
Heat price hp 0.0033 [€/kW h]
Average velocity av 60 [km/h]
Transportation cost per hour ct 75 [€/h]
Truck load tl 30 [t]
Running cost rc 0.019 [€/kW h]
Capital cost of the biogas plant cc 6510 [€/kW h]
if Q(i)< 10,000 t
4976 [€/kW h]
if 10.000 t≤Q(i)< 20,000 t
3441 [€/kW h]
if Q(i)≥20,000 t
Hours of activity per year h 7200 [h]
Table 6
Manure exchange price for different scenarios (Gray cells display scenarios where the
market is not created; green cells display scenarios where biogas producer pays farmers;
blue cells display scenarios where farmers pay biogas producer).
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– The higher the manure discharge cost, the higher the economic
benefits generated per ton of manure are, ceteris paribus (Fig. 3a).
These benefits are mainly in favor of the farmers, in form of higher
reduction in manure discharge cost, ceteris paribus;Fig. 4
– The higher the incentive for energy production from manure, the
higher the economic benefits generated per ton of manure are, ce-
teris paribus (Fig. 3b). These benefits are mainly in favor of the
biogas producers, in form of higher revenues from selling electric
energy;
– The higher the amount of exchanged manure between one farmer and
the biogas producer, the higher the economic benefits generated per
ton of manure are, ceteris paribus (Fig. 3c). These benefits are for
both farmers and biogas producers.
Finally, we find that the threshold ROI for the biogas producer only
affects the decision of agents to start the cooperation but it does not
affect the total economic benefit stemming from such a cooperation.
Fig. 4 summarizes the effect of each investigated parameter, ceteris
paribus, on the performance measures.
5.4. Energy return on investment
Following Yazan et al. [22], the Energy Return on Investment
(EROI) is also computed. Plant scale and transportation distances are
two main factors influencing the EROI of a scenario. Hence, we apply
sensitivity analysis to these variables. Three values for transportation
distance (2, 10, and 30 km) and three values for plant-scale (5000,
20,000, and 100,000 tons) lead to nine combinations as shown in
Table 8. Expectedly, when the transportation distance increases, the
EROI decreases. On the other hand, when plant-scale increases, the
EROI increases as well. However, results fluctuate in a small range with
a minimum EROI of 1.75 and a maximum EROI of 2.10. Therefore,
EROI values are satisfactory even for the worst scenario where the
farms are dispersed and provide low quantity of manure to the small-
scale plant.
6. Discussion
Manure has an economic value of 8–10 €/t in terms of mineral or-
ganic value and 4–6 €/t in terms of energy value. So, unless a noticeable
supply-demand unbalance occurs, animal farmers might recover an
average value of 14 €/t from manure [18]. Our findings show that
manure can locally be priced between−3.33 €/t (farmers pay a biogas
producer) and 7.03 €/t (biogas producer pays farmers), which is in line
with the economic energy value of manure. However, in the current
situation, the huge supply-demand unbalance and regulations imposed
on animal farmers cause a double disadvantage for animal farmers who
are currently paying prices between 15 and 23 €/t for manure discharge
in the Netherlands. Indeed, we observe that regulation for manure
discharge already causes a significant increase of manure prices that are
paid as discharge cost by animal farmers. However, if the demand can
absorb the supply, also the animal farmers may have economic benefits
in terms of profit rather than cost reductions.
Our case study design is implemented without considering the
supply-demand unbalance to observe what would happen in case the
demand absorbs the supply. Accordingly, we can notice the differences
between the scenarios analyzed and the current state. Summarizing the
effects of the analyzed factors, the presence of incentives provides
economic contributions not only for biogas producers but also in-
directly for animal farmers. In fact, when the incentive is high, also
animal farmers obtain benefits in terms of cost reduction or profit.
When the threshold ROI for biogas producers increases, the economic
benefit for farmers reduces. However, this can be compensated by using
more efficient technology, which means higher incentives (Table 3).
The exchanged manure quantity is decisive for launching the co-
operation as we notice from our findings that cooperation is hardly
achieved when the manure quantity is lower than 10,000 t. Higher
discharge cost for animal farmers causes loss of power in contracting,
Table 7
Yearly economic benefits created per ton of exchanged manure (the symbol “–” means that no cooperation arises in the correspondent scenario).
Scenarios Economic benefit generated per unit of exchanged manure [ € ]
Manure discharge cost
[€/t ]
Desired ROI for biogas
producers
Incentives for electricity production from
manure [€/kW h]
Q < 10,000 10,000≤Q < 20,000 Q≥ 20,000
0 0.3 0.07 – – € 4.35
0.11 – € 5.97 € 6.86
0.15 € 7.59 € 8.48 € 9.37
0.2 0.07 – € 4.02 € 4.35
0.11 € 5.44 € 5.97 € 6.86
0.15 € 7.59 € 8.48 € 9.37
0.1 0.07 – € 3.73 € 4.35
0.11 € 5.07 € 5.96 € 6.86
0.15 € 7.58 € 8.48 € 9.37
15 0.3 0.07 € 17.57 € 18.46 € 19.35
0.11 € 20.08 € 20.97 € 21.86
0.15 € 22.59 € 23.48 € 24.37
0.2 0.07 € 17.57 € 18.46 € 19.35
0.11 € 20.08 € 20.97 € 21.86
0.15 € 22.59 € 23.48 € 24.37
0.1 0.07 € 17.57 € 18.46 € 19.35
0.11 € 20.08 € 20.97 € 21.86
0.15 € 22.59 € 23.48 € 24.37
30 0.3 0.07 € 32.57 € 33.46 € 34.35
0.11 € 35.08 € 35.97 € 36.86
0.15 € 37.58 € 38.48 € 39.37
0.2 0.07 € 32.57 € 33.46 € 34.35
0.11 € 35.07 € 35.97 € 36.86
0.15 € 37.58 € 38.48 € 39.37
0.1 0.07 € 32.57 € 33.46 € 34.35
0.11 € 35.08 € 35.97 € 36.86
0.15 € 37.58 € 38.48 € 39.37
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leading to a lower manure exchange price (MEP).
The impact of transportation on cooperation is embedded in the
manure discharge cost and in the dispersion of farmers. If there is no
supply-demand mismatch then, under the presence of environmental
regulations for manure discharge, the higher the distance to the arable
land, the higher the benefit for animal farmers in case of cooperation,
i.e., other factors provide economic benefits. If the other factors do not
provide an economically convenient situation, the transportation dis-
tance to the arable land has a negative impact on the implementation of
the cooperation. Furthermore, in the case of cooperation, a short dis-
tance between 0 and 15 km allows the farmers and the biogas producer
to create higher benefits within a municipality. We can observe that


























































manure exchanged quantity [t]
Fig. 2. Average manure exchange price, computed from all the simulated scenarios, as a
function of different levels of threshold ROI by the biogas producer (a), incentives for
energy production from manure (b), and amount of exchanged manure between one



































































































































manure exchanged quan?ty [t]
Fig. 3. Average amount of economic benefits created per ton of exchanged manure,
computed from all the simulated scenarios, as a function of different levels of manure
discharge cost (a), incentives for energy production from manure (b), and amount of
exchanged manure between one farmer and the biogas producer (c), ceteris paribus.
Fig. 4. Impact of the investigated parameters on the manure exchange price and the
economic benefits generated per ton of exchanged manure. The symbol (+) stands for a
positive effect whereas the symbol (−) stands for a negative effect.
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created but only cause small changes in MEP. Hence, if there was no
supply-demand mismatch, transportation costs would not be a sig-
nificant obstacle to implement cooperation at a local level between
animal farmers and biogas producers. However, such a significant
supply-demand mismatch currently causes a considerable increase in
transportation movements between the Netherlands, Germany, and
France. Although it is a serious challenge for the Netherlands to over-
come such a supply surplus, our results are replicable for other geo-
graphical locations where a supply-demand mismatch does not exist,
i.e., positive revenues for both supply and demand sides are possible at
a local level.
This paper provides a novel business insight into manure-based
bioenergy production, proposing a globally applicable ABM that takes
into account the critical factors influencing the economic viability of
the case. These factors are selected based on their impact on the busi-
ness-making strategy of each actor. There exist, however, several fac-
tors that might influence the technical outcomes, although they do not
directly influence the generalizability of the economic findings. These
factors are discussed below.
Properties of biomass type. Anaerobic digestion (AD) is applicable to
different biomass types such as fruit waste, garden waste, grain silage,
olive pulp, etc. Several factors such as organic content, dry matter or
volatile solids existing in the biomass might influence the amount and
content of biogas produced. Following Yazan et al. [22], we consider a
dry content of 12% and an organic content of 85% for pig manure in
this paper. Changes in these values might influence the production
outcome and hence the economic conditions of cooperation for each
actor. However, this is simply addressable in the ABM proposed in this
paper via different levels of mark-up for animal farmers and ROI values
for biogas producers. For example, if an animal farmer supplies manure
with higher organic and dry content, then she can expect a higher mark-
up in the negotiation phase. Vice versa, if a biogas producer receives
manure with low organic and dry content, then she can expect a lower
ROI and offer a lower MEP to the animal farmer. In this way, the ABM is
flexible and able to economically take into account other factors, e.g.,
the above-mentioned biomass characteristics, which are not in-
vestigated in this paper.
Biomass conversion and biogas generation technology. As with many
biomass types, manure can also be processed by other technologies such
as pyrolysis, as an alternative to AD, and the obtained biogas can be
purified and upgraded under different conditions. Depending on the
biomass type, various upgrading technologies can be appropriate, such
as in the case of biogas production from micro-algae [108,109]. De-
pending on the technology adopted, technical characteristics of pro-
duced biogas might vary, which in turn influences the energy outcome
in terms of heat and electricity. As we deal with the economic aspects of
implementing a market for manure to be used in bioenergy production,
we take into account the economic impact of different technology levels
in the ABM via different levels of incentives. This is perfectly in line
with a government's incentive policy reflecting higher subsidies for
higher technology levels (0.07, 0.11, and 0.15 €/kW h produced). Ac-
cordingly, any fluctuations on technical outcomes or governmental
incentives in different geographical areas do not influence the working
of the ABM proposed in this paper (but it does influence the outcomes).
In contrast, the model is applicable to any geographical and technolo-
gical context to enhance the cooperation between animal farmers and
biogas producers and support the creation of second-generation bio-
mass (SGB) markets adopting different technologies.
Uncertainty associated to modeling. The most relevant uncertainty
issue might technically appear because of the seasonality of manure
use. However, the seasonality impact is also addressed in the ABM by
considering different levels of manure discharge cost, i.e., 0–30 €/ton.
Considering the case- and site-specificity of SGB, we simulate all the
factors taken into account in a range, e.g., 0–15 km of transportation
distance and 0–160,709 tons of manure. Indeed, a practitioner should
first locate itself in one of the combination scenarios and then reflect on
the proposed pricing strategy, which significantly reduces the un-
certainty in the negotiation phase.
The presence of natural gas in the market. As biogas is capable of
substituting natural gas, it can be a good alternative for countries that
do not possess natural gas reserves. However, producing biogas from
manure becomes economically viable only if incentives are provided
and technical issues are solved regarding the injection of biogas to
natural grids. This is an issue beyond the scope of this paper, which
concentrates on proposing a global decision support framework to fa-
cilitate the implementation of SGB markets.
Potential conflict of interest among actors. The ABM proposed in this
paper takes into account the competitive nature of liberal markets by
modeling each agent as autonomous. This means that, triggered by
competitiveness, each actor has the chance of accepting or declining a
MEP offer based on its own interest. Such an interest is reflected in
mark-up values for animal farmers and ROI values for biogas producers.
Indeed, a cooperation might economically be feasible for one actor
while it does not pay-off for the other one. In fact, our findings confirm
the formation of a liberal market where some potential cooperation
opportunities do not realize due to the autonomous moves of the actors
while there are also cases that pay-off for both sides leading to a mature
market. Potential conflict of interests might also emerge caused by the
presence of other actors in the (potential) market such as bioenergy
producers adapting pyrolysis for manure processing or the ones using
other technologies employing other types of biomass. This would
trigger further research on the regional competition of bioenergy supply
chains (SC) aimed to be conducted by the authors of this paper.
7. Conclusions
This paper provides two novel contributions to the domain of
bioenergy production and one novel contribution to the domain of
manure-based biogas production. First, it provides a globally valid ABM
that facilitates the negotiation between suppliers and producers within
non-mature second-generation biomass (SGB) markets. 235,629 dif-
ferent scenarios per each municipality are analyzed via using the pro-
posed ABM. Considering the similar nature of other SGB types, in
particular the ones emerging as the residues of forestry, agricultural, or
food-processing activities, the model has a vast field of applicability. In
particular, the logical reasoning on negotiation phase proposed in the
ABM is globally applicable to the business models based on such SGB
types. The model is also appropriate for the bio-based businesses op-
erating in the form of industrial symbiosis, i.e., wastes of a company are
used as substitutes of traditional primary resources of another com-
pany.
Second, it reveals the conditions that allow the creation of mature
SGB markets. This is an important issue because SGB is not produced
upon demand but emerge as a secondary output from other primary
activities, e.g., agricultural residues as a secondary output of agriculture
or manure as a secondary output of animal farming. Such a
Table 8













100,000 30 69,087 34,969 1.98
10 69,087 33,506 2.06
2 69,087 32,921 2.10
20,000 30 13,817 7287 1.90
10 13,817 6887 2.01
2 13,817 6728 2.05
5000 30 3454 1978 1.75
10 3454 1822 1.90
2 3454 1759 1.96
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characteristic is a challenge to economically value the SGB and im-
plement profitable business. The case of manure is an appropriate ex-
ample which is not analyzed in the literature from economic perspec-
tive by considering different business entities. Therefore, this paper
provides a novel practical contribution to animal farmers and (poten-
tial) biogas producers about how to implement a profitable business
based on manure processing.
Overall, manure can be better exploited if the supply surplus pro-
blem is solved and economic gains for all actors are possible by mini-
mizing environmental impacts. From practical and managerial per-
spectives, increased quantities of manure lead to higher exchange
prices, which is an advantage for large-scale farms. In the Netherlands,
this advantage turns into a disadvantage for large scale farmers in the
current situation of manure surplus causing high discharge cost. Hence,
considering the current market situation, investing in biogas production
at locations where large scale farms are located would be advantageous
until the manure surplus is met by demand. Furthermore, existing re-
lationships between swine farmers with arable land owners are also
critical in the contracting phase with biogas producers. If the arable
land is too distant, accordingly, the collection price requested by arable
land owners is also too high. This increases the chance of cooperation
between a swine farmer and a biogas producer to make a mutually
profitable business.
This paper addresses the case of energy recovery from manure. As
mentioned before, manure has a higher added value thanks to its mi-
neral content compared to its energy-based added value. Triggered by
market distortions and environmental regulations, the Netherlands
have been seeking to implement a manure-based refinery that would
simultaneously produce biogas, heat, and electricity and process
manure into its minerals. This initiative, which is a demo-plant project,
is supported by the EU Commission [18]. The goal is to create an al-
ternative fertilizers market in which mineral recovery, e.g., fats, trace
elements, undigested starch or protein [110], is 100% possible. The
main advantages of such a refinery are the reduction of artificial fer-
tilizers, increased crop productivity in arable lands, and added value
creation within the Netherlands. In addition, the methane reduction
and manure upgrading are strong motivations to provide incentives to
implement small-scale biogas digesters which currently do not pay off.
Future research should also address a fair distribution of incentives
through the manure-based bioenergy SCs, which in turn may be helpful
to achieve the supply-demand balance for manure in the Netherlands
without damaging the livestock farming. After discovering that mu-
tually beneficial agreements are possible between animal farmers and
biogas producers, the authors aim at extending the ABM proposed in
this paper in a manure exchange network where farmers can receive
offers from multiple biogas producers. This is particularly relevant as
large-scale biogas plants might offer better conditions to the animal
farmers located in locations farther than the small-scale biogas produ-
cers located nearby animal farms. Similarly, a small-scale biogas plant
adopting better technology might offer better conditions to an animal
farm farther away than a big-scale biogas plant adopting less qualified
technology. Hence, an ABM analyzing M-to-N manure-biogas markets
in which animal farmers can form coalitions would better reveal co-
operation conditions.
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